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Transitional Constitutionalism and the Case of the Arab Spring 
 
 
I. Introduction. 
 
In the past two years Egypt has gone from being a beacon of hope for liberalizing 
change in the Middle East to a stark reminder of the potentially explosive nature of 
political reform. Events in Egypt form a microcosm of the broader struggles that 
appear to be unfolding in the Middle East. A discredited and dictatorial head of state 
has been removed. Democratic elections have been held. A government was formed 
following election by a majority. So far these events appear consistent with the 
pattern of revolution – the removal of an illegitimate leader and his replacement with 
a democratically elected government that is representative of the people. What 
happened next, however, demonstrates the complex relationship between law, politics 
and transition in the Middle East. Eighteen months after the Islamist party of 
Mohammed Morsi was elected, and following further mass mobilisations that 
demonstrated the depth of division that existed over the actions of the new 
government, the government was overthrown in a military coup. While those in 
charge of the new military government represent themselves as pro-democratic and 
secularizing, it is hard to escape the irony that the Egyptian people, having 
overthrown one military dictator, are now being ruled, once again, by a leader 
installed by the military.  
In an attempt to reassure the country as to its intentions, the army presented a 
roadmap for transition, central to which was the amendment of the constitution 
enacted by the previous government. In this way the constitution has become the 
central focal point of the Egyptian transition. The use of the language of transition by 
the Egyptian government raises interesting questions about the adoption of such a 
framework. It increasingly appears that the language of transition imports a degree of 
legal and moral legitimacy to those who claim it, particularly in the eyes of the 
international community.
1
 However in these circumstances it is far from clear that the 
dominant international understanding of transition fits with the political dynamics on 
the ground.  
This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the framework of transition 
and the enactment of a new constitution for Egypt. It does so by using the relatively 
under explored concept of transitional constitutionalism, interrogating some of the 
key claims on which transitional constitutionalism is based, and questioning their 
application in the Egyptian context. The article first considers what is meant by 
transitional constitutionalism and the key features that make the idea of a transitional 
constitution different from more traditional ideas. It then moves on to address in more 
detail some of the problems associated with the current model of transitional 
                                                        
1
 See for example the adoption of the label ‘Transitional Council’ by rebels in Libya prior to the death 
of Ghadaffi. See Stefan Talmon,’ Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council’ ASIL 
Insight, June 16, 2011; a similar model has now been adopted in Syria. See ‘Syrian Opposition Submits 
Plan for Transitional Government’ Al-Jazeera America, February 12 2014. 
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constitutionalism, in particular noting the potential for overly legalistic analysis of the 
role of constitutions and their associated institutions which obscures the 
transformative potential that is intended to flow from transitional constitutionalism. 
Finally the article explores some of the primary cleavages whose existence challenge 
the idea of a one size fits all approach to constitutionalism, and concludes by 
suggesting that the transformative potential of transitional constitutionalism is being 
lost as a result of the emphasis placed on liberal frameworks. It advocates viewing 
international law as a framework to facilitate participation rather than as providing a 
blue print for constitutional reform that can transcend political conflict. The article 
draws on the example of Egypt to illustrate some of the assumptions that are made 
regarding the purpose of constitutionalism and the impact that these assumptions have 
on the ability of the constitution to deliver transitional aims.  
 
II. Transition and the Constitutional Moment 
 
The linking of transition and constitutional processes is not unique to Egypt.
2
 There is 
a long history of international assistance for constitutional processes in the aftermath 
of political change, whether decolonization or following conflict.
3
 However recent 
years have seen the gradual incorporation of principles of constitutionalism into the 
discourse of transition. Constitutions, it is argued, ‘can secure functions of securing 
and sustaining short term and long term governance, which place [them] within a 
quintessentially transitional rubric…’ 4  While still a relatively under theorized 
concept, particularly in the legal literature, the idea of transitional constitutionalism, 
or at least the idea that the constitutional process fits within the normative framework 
of transition, is increasingly evident in both theory and practice.
5
 Similarly there is an 
increasing trend to view peace agreements that mark the onset of transition as a 
constitutional moment, thereby making constitutionalism immanent to the concept of 
transition.
6
 There is an inherent expectation that the design of the post conflict state 
will not only reflect international standards of rule of law and human rights 
protection, but that these standards will be incorporated into the constitutional 
framework.
7
 This represents a shift away from viewing transition as a purely 
                                                        
2
 See Kirsten McConnachie & John Morrison, ‘Constitution Making, Transition and the Reconstruction 
of Society’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart, 2008) 
3
 Vijayashri Sripati, ‘UN Constitutional Assistance Missions in Comprehensive Peace Missions: An 
Inventory 1989-2011’ (2012) 19 International Peacekeeping 93: Ralph Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East 
Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration’ (2001) 95 American Journal 
of International Law 583; Yash Ghai, ‘Universalism and Relativism: human rights as a framework for 
negotiating interethnic claims’ in William Twining (ed) Human Rights: Southern Voices (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009);  
4
 McConnachie & Morrison (n2) 80 
5
 See Hallie Ludsin, ‘Peacemaking and Constitution Drafting: A Dysfunctional Marriage’ (2011) 33 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 239 
6
 Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (OUP 2008) 392 
7
 See Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post 
Conflict Situations, (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616 on the use of normative principles to guide transition. 
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descriptive term, towards its use as a normative concept.
8
 In this way the idea of 
transition presents an alternative model of political change that replaces the 
spontaneity of revolution with a more gradual approach. 
While the concept of transitional constitutionalism may be relatively new,
9
 
war, revolution, and the founding and re-founding of law are not. The traditional 
vision of constitutionalism is that it reflects or codifies consensus among the 
population as to how the state should be organized.
10
 This can be contrasted with the 
idea of constitutionalism in the aftermath of revolution, where rather than reflecting 
an existing and settled consensus on the constitution, it marks a break or a rupture 
from what has gone before.
11
 The effect of the constitution in these contexts is to 
constitute the new nation with the authority of the revolution. This model does not 
necessarily seek to achieve consensus, but rather to enshrine political gains into 
constitutional law, albeit in the name of the people. Under this model the constitution 
becomes the necessary and final stage of the revolutions.
12
. However it has been 
argued that neither of these models, either of classical constitutionalism, or of 
revolutionary constitutionalism, adequately capture the dynamics of constitutionalism 
in the context of modern transitions.
13
 This is because in many contemporary 
transitional contexts power has not been seized as the result of a complete revolution 
or overthrow of a prior regime, but as the result of a negotiated settlement or transfer 
of power which requires more delicate negotiation of the future of the state. 
Constitution making in these contexts has therefore been interpreted as playing a 
more critical or transformative role in that it is ‘not only constituted by the prevailing 
political order but is constitutive of political change’.14 This suggests that the role of 
the constitution is to guide such processes of negotiation rather than simply to codify 
a finalized outcome. A transitional constitution is required to be both backward and 
forward looking, in that in addressing the future, it must take account of the history of 
injustice that has given rise to the transition.
15
 Now it could be argued that this 
interpretation suggests nothing new, in that all constitutions will be the result of 
political and social upheaval. This is as true of modern liberal democratic 
constitutions as it is for those arising from war or revolution. The re-founding of law 
will always be intended to mark a break from the past, but will bear within it the 
traces of that past that have shaped the history and narrative of the state and its 
                                                        
8
 See Ludson (n 5); Vivien Hart, ‘Constitution Making and the Transformation of Conflict’ (2001) 26 
Peace and Change 153 
9
 The term was first used by Teitel in her 2000 work Transitional Justice, but has lain dormant until 
relatively recently. 
10
 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP, 2000)  
11
 For detailed discussion of the difference between these two models see ibid 191-194 
12
 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ (1997) 106 
Yale Law Journal 2009, 2055 
13
 Teitel (n 10) 
14
 Teitel (n 10) 191 
15
 McConnachie and Morrisson suggest that the notion that the past must be addressed in a 
constitutional document has become increasingly mainstreamed since the South African Transition. (n 
2) 83 
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constitution.
16
However the difference that emerges between classical and 
revolutionary understandings of the constitution and the transitional constitution is the 
extent to which law is expected to shape rather than reflect that national identity.
17
 
The underlying premise of the model of transitional constitutionalism is that the 
constitution itself will provide a focal point around which the citizens of a state can 
unite, representing the constitution of a nation. 
In this context Teitel suggests that the idea of ‘foundation’ can bridge the 
divide between classical and revolutionary understandings of constitutionalism in that 
by responding to a legacy of injustice, the constitution itself is used to construct a new 
national identity, and is therefore constitutive rather than reflective of political 
change.
18
 Constitution drafting in this context embodies the goals of peacemaking, 
such as ending violence and entrenching the rule of law, aimed at responding to past 
injustices by providing a new liberal framework for the state.
19
  By doing this 
transitional constitutionalism uses the constitution as a tool to deliver peace. 
Teitel summarizes the claims made for transitional constitutionalism as follows; 
Transitional constitutionalism provides an alternative paradigm. The 
paradigm’s distinctive paradox is that ... constitutionalism does not 
stand independently from the political order but is inextricably 
enmeshed in transformative politics.
20
 
The role of a constitution, when viewed through a transitional lens, is not simply to 
mark a break from the past and found a new legal order, its role is rather to 
acknowledge that past. As a result, Teitel suggests, ‘what is considered 
constitutionally just is contextual and contingent, relating to the attempt to transform 
legacies of the past.’21  To do this, the model of transitional constitutionalism draws 
on international law to provide a normative basis for reform, grounded in positive 
law, but also incorporating values associated with natural law.
22
 This creates the 
possibility of a transformative approach to constitutionalism that remains rooted in 
existing principles of international law. 
 
 
A. The Backward Looking Constitution 
The primary role of the constitution in transition is to distance a successor regime 
from an abusive predecessor. The commitment of the new regime to democratic 
principles is demonstrated through the prosecution of human rights abuses and strict 
commitment to the rule of law.
23
 The way in which the constitutional aspect of 
                                                        
16
 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’ in Elizabeth Rottenbert (ed) Negotiations: 
Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001 (Stanford University Press, 2002) 46 
17
 Ludsin (n 5) 264 
18
 Teitel (n 10) 
19
 Secretary General’s report (n 7) 
20
 Teitel (n 10) 210 
21
 Teitel (n 12) 2057 
22
 Teitel (n 10) 21 
23
 The Report of the Secretary General (n 7) articulates a common language for justice in these 
contexts, including a detailed definition of rule of law. It is now this definition that underpins 
international law and policy in these contexts.  
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transition has been interpreted has aimed to bridge the divide between ending conflict 
and delivering lasting political settlement.
24
 Rather than simply helping to consolidate 
an already agreed successor regime, the role of transitional constitutionalism is to 
shape the very processes and outcomes of transition.  
To achieve this, transitional constitutionalism draws on internationalized 
standards of justice to ensure that the normative goals of ensuring accountability for 
human rights abuse and ensuring non-recurrence through the entrenchment of 
democracy are met.
25
 In this regard we see the distinction between constitutionalism 
viewed through a transitional lens and constitutionalism viewed through the lens of 
international law. International law has traditionally been concerned with 
constitutionalism as a procedurally defined process.
26
 While constitutional reform has 
often been required or legitimated by international action such as UN resolutions or 
peace agreements,
27
 such documents have to date been silent on the substantive 
outcome of the process.
28
  In contrast, the new transitional model suggests that a 
particular substantive outcome is necessary to address past legacies of injustice, as a 
way of overcoming or transcending domestic political divisions.
29
  
The transitional constitution will define the boundaries of politics and justice 
in the new order, and as such does not simply reflect an existing national unity, but 
rather plays a crucial role in the construction of the new society.
30
 It will ‘delineate 
the normative basis for executive government’,31 and will ensure the participation of 
previously excluded or marginalized political and social groupings. Included within 
this goal are, for example, the definition of equality provisions and addressing 
questions of social justice such as the distribution of property and the recognition and 
entrenchment of social and economic rights.
32
 This is seen particularly prominently in 
the interim constitution of South Africa, for example, where questions of equality 
were placed at the forefront of the constitution, making a clear statement of a new 
order.
33
 The entrenchment of substantive human rights principles is the way in which 
                                                        
24
 Ludsin (n 5) 
25
 Teitel (n 10) 
26
 Internationally assisted constitutional processes date back to the process of decolonization. Sripati (n 
3). The emphasis of these processes has always been on ensuring participation and local ownership of 
processes. See Guidance Note of the Secretary General, ‘United Nations Assistance in Constitution 
Making Processes’ (April 2009)  
27
 See for example UN sponsored constitutional processes in Cambodia, East Timor, and more recently 
Somalia, all of which were mandated by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII. For a more 
detailed discussion see Catherine Turner and Ruth Houghton, ‘Constitution Making and Post Conflict 
Reconstruction’ in Matthew Saul and James Sweeny (eds) The Role of International Law in Post 
Conflict Reconstruction (Routledge, 2015) (forthcoming) 
28
 See Phillip Dan and Zaid Al-Ali, ‘The Internationalised “Pouvoir Constituent” – Constitution 
Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor’ (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 423 on the procedural nature of the process in East Timor. The procedural focus of 
UN assistance is also evidence in the Secretary General’s Guidance note of 2009 (n 26) 
29
 See Teitel (n 10); See also Ludsin (n 5) 
30
 Teitel (n 12) 2062 
31
 McConnachie and Morrison (n2) 79 
32
 Aeyal M Gross, ‘The Constitution, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South 
Africa and Israel’ (2004) 40 Standford Journal of International Law  (n 7) 57; See also Antoine Buyse, 
Post Conflict Housing Restitution: The ECHR Perspective (Intersentia 2008)  
33
 See Teitel (n 10) 
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the constitution responds to a legacy of injustice. However the forward-looking 
element of transitional constitutionalism also requires that the institutions put in place 
are stable and capable of preventing the recurrence of violence.  
 
B. The Forward Looking Constitution: The Constitution and ‘The 
People’  
Transitional constitutionalism is increasingly associated with peace and security in 
international law.
34
 Constitutional reform is now seen by the international community 
as a necessary means of ensuring that a post conflict or post revolution state complies 
with its international obligations, increasingly interpreted as complying with best 
practice.
35
 Therefore the significance of transitional constitutionalism is not limited to 
the domestic sphere. While it is ostensibly intended to redress the balance of power 
within a state, the nature of the constitution remains of great significance 
internationally. International law exerts an increasing substantive influence on the 
constitutional process.
36
 This has been particularly evident in the case of states subject 
to administration by international organizations, but remains equally true of states 
attempting to navigate their own transitions.
37
  
International involvement does not begin with the constitution, but rather the 
substantive content of the constitution will reflect a much longer process of 
engagement with international law and international actors that serves to frame the 
constitutional process from the outset. This may begin with a United Nations 
authorized intervention in a state, as was the case in Cambodia or East Timor, for 
example.
38
 However, more subtly, it may begin with an internationally mediated 
peace agreement. Often parties to the conflict and peace mediators will draw on 
international law guidelines, such as UN resolutions, recommendations, treaties, or 
even established principles of customary international law to frame the process and 
substance of an agreement.
39
 Hay describes how a distinctive feature of 
internationalized constitutions is their ‘normative embedding in the discourse, 
framework, principles and rules of international law.’40 These principles will underpin 
much of the negotiating process, particularly where an international actor such as the 
UN is involved in brokering the deal. This reflects the increased willingness of the 
international community to actively oversee and evaluate constitutional processes, 
                                                        
34
 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000 reprinted in 39 
ILM 1432 (2000) (Brahimi) 
35
 See Emily Hay ‘International(ized) Constitutions and Peace Making’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 141; See also Dan and Al-Ali (n 28) 
36
 Hay (n 35) 
37
 See Noa Feldman, ‘Imposed Constitutionalism’ (2005) 27 Connecticut Law Review 857 
38
 See Security Council Resolution 1272 (2002) on East Timor, and Resolution 746 (1992) on 
Cambodia. For more detailed discussion see Turner and Houghton (n 27)  
39
 See Hay (n 35) 145; See also Visar Morsina et al, ‘The Relationship Between International Law and 
National Law: A Constitutional Perspective’ (2011) International Journal of Constitutional Law 274 
on the way in which international law became embedded in Kosovo as a result of the Athissari peace 
plan; See also Paul Mageean and Martin O’Brien, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human 
Rights and the Good Friday Agreement’ (1998-1999) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 1499 
40
 Hay (n 35) 145 
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and with them the emerging governance structures of transitional states.
41
 This is 
particularly true in the areas of human rights and democracy, evident in the 
incorporation of oversight mechanisms into the substance of peace agreements.
42
 It is 
also reflected in the broader range of issues considered to be of international 
concerns, for example the inclusion of women within negotiating processes, and the 
protection of minorities within constitutional settlements.
43
  
This can be read as a gradual reformulation of traditional understandings of 
legitimacy in international law,
44
 now increasingly evaluated with reference to the 
concerns of the international community and modern ideas of domestic 
constitutionalism as the benchmark of a modern state.
45
 What this makes clear is that 
post conflict constitutionalism can no longer take place in a vacuum. Even where a 
state attempts to negotiate its own political transition, as is currently occurring as part 
of the Arab Spring, constitutional processes and outcomes will inevitably be 
evaluated on the extent to which they comply with or even prioritize international 
law.
46
 As a result those drafting a constitution must increasingly take account not only 
of domestic political priorities, but of the interests of the international community in 
such a process. In this way the internationalized discourse of transition brings an 
external force to bear on local and domestic constitutional processes. In particular 
what this international framework presents is a checklist of indicators whose presence 
can be taken to indicate the success or otherwise of transition.
47
  
Thus it becomes apparent how the response to past injustice, the so-called 
backward looking element of transitional constitutionalism, is translated into an 
emphasis on ensuring meaningful liberalising change, on creating a bounded political 
space, rather than reflecting any existing consensus or re-establishment of sovereignty 
of the people.
48
 The past history of injustice serves to legitimate this process and a 
constitutional document that enshrines these liberal principles of democracy and 
human rights is evidence that ‘transition’ has in fact occurred49 As Gross suggests in 
the context of constitutionalism, the analytical tool of transitional justice becomes ‘a 
normative tool for evaluating change and the degree of commitment to correcting 
injustice.’50 
 
C. Law, Politics and the Incomplete Revolution 
                                                        
41
 Turner & Houghton (n 27) 
42
 See Sripati (n 3) 94 
43
 Spripati (n 3) 
44
 Hay (n 35) 
45
 Morsina et al (n 39) 279 
46
 See for example Amnesty International. ‘Egypt’s new constitution limits fundamental freedoms and 
ignores the rights of women’ 30 November 2012, criticizing the Egyptian constitution for failing to 
provide for the supremacy of international law over national law. Available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/rn/news/ (Accessed 31 August 2014) 
47
 Hart (n 8), 157 suggests that this view of constitutionalism views the constitution as a completed 
map of conflict resolution rather than simply a landmark along the way.  
48
 Teitel (n12); Ludsin (n 5);  
49
 Teitel (n 12) 2079 
50
 Gross (n 32) 50 
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There is a risk that an emphasis on the principles of liberalism, and indeed an 
expectation that a constitution can mark the end of transition will undermine the 
potential of transitional constitutionalism to deliver a meaningful response to conflict. 
The manner in which new social protections are to be achieved under the transitional 
model of constitutionalism is through the ‘superentrenchment’ of norms that are 
intended to guide the state’s liberal democratic identity.51  These norms, it is claimed, 
do not necessarily represent or express existing consensus, but rather underpin the 
transformative purpose of the constitution through entrenchment of normative 
standards in terms of the protection of rights.
52
 However the adoption of a very 
normative vision of law in contexts of deep political division can in itself exacerbate 
tensions. Hart describes how ‘employing the language of law affects not only the 
form of constitution making and the range of considerations reviewed, but also the 
possibilities and models of participation in the process.’53 This also brings into sharp 
focus the tension between the role of constitutionalism as reflecting national identity 
and the possibility of constitutionalism as forging national identity.
54
  
More recent work in the field of transitional constitutionalism has sought to 
problematize the traditional model of the constitution as negotiated by elites and 
given to the people.
55
 It has instead sought to re-locate sovereignty in the people 
rather than in the state. This analysis sees grass roots involvement as the key to 
legitimate constitutional transformation.
56
 Ultimately what is sought is to reconstitute 
the sovereignty of the nation that has been lost in the course of war or revolution.
57
 
This creates a tension at the point of delivery between the more absolutist claims for 
strict enforcement of international legal standards that would lend legitimacy to the 
state and those who advocate a more grass roots and process oriented vision of 
transition resting on notions such as participatory democracy and local 
empowerment.
58
 When examined in the context of Egypt, the capacity of law to effect 
transformative change, as well as the question of who constitutes the nation reveal the 
limitations of the current transitional model of constitutionalism. In the case of Egypt, 
and the Arab Spring more generally, this model may assume the possibility of 
political unity that does not exist.  
 
III.  Claiming the Legacy of the Past: Revolution and Constitution in 
Egypt  
 
                                                        
51
 Teitel (n 12) 2063 
52
 Teitel (n 12) 2070 
53
 Hart (n 8) 159 
54
 Ludsin (n 5) 264 
55
 McConnachie and Morrison (n 2); Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a “thicker” 
understanding of transitional justice’ (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 411 
56
 This brings the idea of transitional constitutionalism back into line with the procedural model of 
constitutional assistance that has existed until recently.  
57
 For a more detailed theoretical exploration of this dynamic in the context of Tunisia see Ilan Rua 
Wall, ‘Tunisia and the Critical Legal Theory of Dissensus’ (2012) 23 Law and Critique 219 
58
 Ludsin (n 5) 
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In 2011 the Arab world was rocked by events in Tunisia which ended in the toppling 
of  President Ben Ali. Shortly afterwards, protests began in Egypt. What began with a 
small number of protesters grew into a mass movement protesting against President 
Mubarak and demanding the fall of the regime.
59
 The protests received significant 
coverage in the Western media, and came to be known as an ‘Arab Spring’, which in 
itself was significant in that it suggested an awakening, the beginning of a move 
towards enlightenment in Arab politics.
60
 The protests, which culminated in the 
removal of a number of heads of state, were widely characterized as having been the 
response to decades of repressive rule under a rigid and unresponsive political 
system.
61
 They were represented by commentators as the culmination of a decade of 
protest in the Arab world.
62
 The frame, it was suggested, was ‘clearly that of a 
universal secular call for freedom and justice’.63 The protests appeared to be driven by 
young educated activists who became the face of the uprising in the Western media. A 
large part of their success lay in their ability to communicate through the media, both 
online social media and mainstream outlets, their aspirations for a secular and liberal 
Middle East that appealed to a Western audience.
64
 The youth of Tahrir Square sought 
to claim the mantle of revolutionary legitimacy and, as one commentator suggests, 
‘place themselves above the political fray as its soul and spokesmen.’65 This was a 
crucial part of the success of the protests in toppling Mubarak, for in order for the 
protests to be successful it was necessary to present a unified narrative of revolution. 
It appeared that the inevitable outcome of the protests would be a swift transition to 
liberal democracy.
66
 However, even an outsider could see that far from being a 
unified demand, one that embodied the spirit of the revolution, this was only one 
among many visions of the new Egypt.
67
 Once the initial fervour of revolution had 
died down, the question of who could claim to speak with the authoritative voice of 
the revolution remained contested.
68
 While public opinion may have coalesced for a 
brief moment in history, unified by the demand that Mubarak should go,
69
 this cannot 
be read as the existence of a unified body politic within Egypt. Indeed to read the 
                                                        
59
 For an overview of these events see Jeremy Bowen, The Arab Uprisings (Simon & Schuster, 2012) 
60
 See Nathan Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’ (2013) 24 Journal of Democracy 45 
61
 Michele Penner Angrist, ‘Morning in Tunisia: The Frustrations of the Arab World Boil Over’ 
Foreign Affairs, January 16 2011; Richard Haas, ‘Reflections on the Revolution in Egypt’ Project 
Syndicate, February 13 2011 
62
 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter Revolution and 
the Making of a New Era (Yale University Press, 2012), 4; Marc Lynch The Arab Uprising: The 
Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (Public Affairs, 2012) 63 
63
 Slavoj Zizek, ‘For Egypt, this is the miracle of Tahrir Square’ The Guardian, Thursday 10th February 
2011 
64
 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren (n 62) 6; See also Statement of President Barak Obama on Egypt, 
February 10, 2011 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/10/statement-president-
barack-obama-egypt > accessed 17 October 2013 
65
 Lynch (n 62) 72 
66
 David E Sanger, ‘Obama Presses Egypt’s Military on Democracy’ New York Times, February 11 
2011. Sanger demonstrates the way in which the protests in Tahrir Square were characterised to fit 
within an overarching narrative of non-violent protest and unequivocal moral force which set Egypt on 
a path of genuine democracy. 
67
 Brown (n 60) 
68
 Jack Shenker, ‘The Struggle to Document Egypt’s Revolution’ The Guardian, Friday 15th July 2011 
69
 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren (n 62), 105 
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protests in Egypt as a unified and coherent narrative of popular uprisings over 
simplifies the struggles that lie beneath the surface.
70
  
Within months of Mubarak’s departure the struggle to claim the revolution 
had begun.
71
 Despite the prominence of young, liberal activists at the forefront of the 
revolution, it was the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) that assumed 
executive power and declared the beginning of a transitional period in Egypt.
72
 Their 
first transitional act was to hold a referendum to ratify amendments to the constitution 
that introduced new eligibility requirements for presidential candidates and limited 
the term of office for future presidents.
73
 These amendments were made in 
anticipation of presidential elections, however the precise sequencing of these events 
became less clear in the months following the revolution.
74
 Less than a year after 
Tahrir Square a more complex picture was emerging. Polls revealed a degree of 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood,
75
 but also a tacit desire to get on with formal 
politics, proceeding with the transition as a means of normalizing politics – removing 
the military by election rather than by protest on the streets.
76
 However as the 
‘transition’ stalled, renewed protests against the SCAF grew in size and intensity, 
dominated by Islamists who posed a direct challenge to liberal ideals and to those 
who sought to limit the role of religion.
77
 The relationship between revolution and 
constitutionalism was suddenly thrown into sharp focus.  
As discussed, traditional understandings of revolutionary constitutionalism 
cast the constitution as the end point of a revolution, the victory of revolutionary 
ideals that will be enshrined into the new order.
78
 Similarly in transitional contexts the 
historical narrative of injustice will shape the outcome of the constitutional process. 
The struggle over who controls the revolution is therefore crucial. For whoever can 
claim ownership of the revolution claims the transition and therefore the power to 
define the future shape of the state.
79
 This was clearly demonstrated in Egypt in the 
actions of both the SCAF and the subsequently elected Morsi government. The fact 
that under the SCAF proposals a constitution was to be drafted within a short space of 
time, and preceding presidential elections, was read as an attempt by the armed forces 
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to secure their own role within the system.
80
 However the election of a new 
government over a six week period in late 2011 introduced a new dynamic into the 
debate. The first task of the newly elected government, headed by Mohamed Morsi of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, was to establish a constitutional assembly to draft a new 
constitution. Following a particularly divisive drafting process, discussed in more 
detail below, the constitution was put to the Egyptian people in December 2012.
81
 
The response to the draft constitution revealed the polarization caused by a 
constitution drafted without genuine political engagement. Mohyeldin describes 
clashes between Islamist forces who supported the constitution on one side, and 
secular and liberal forces who opposed it on the other.
82
 Particular cleavages emerged 
over specific provisions that suggested a more prominent role within the state for a 
strict interpretation of religious law that was not necessarily shared by more 
progressive Muslims..
83
 Division was manifest on key questions such as the role of 
religion in the constitution, and the perceived failure to include adequate protections 
for human rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of religion and women’s 
rights.
84
 In particular the actions of the Morsi government have been criticized as 
seeking to shift the political discourse in Egypt towards including Islam as the key 
referent, the effect of which was to marginalize alternative perspectives from the 
political left or the liberal opposition.
85
 One key feature that unified commentators, 
however, was that the draft constitution was rushed through by a Committee that was 
not representative of the population, without proper consultation, and that as a result 
there was no national consensus on its provisions.
86
 This attempt to rush through a 
constitutional document that lacked popular support revealed the ongoing nature of 
the struggle for the revolution.  
A similar dynamic emerged following the removal of Morsi from power in 
July 2013. This time the military seized power in response to another wave of protest 
on the same scale, if not bigger, than those that had toppled Mubarak in 2011. The 
seizure of power was initially justified as necessary to restore order and democracy in 
light of the perceived failure of the Morsi government to oversee an effective 
transition. Just as the protests in Tahrir Square were represented as a response to the 
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illegitimate rule of Hosni Mubarak, so too was it necessary to be able to discredit the 
elected government of Mohamed Morsi to justify the seizure of power. The struggle 
over who speaks with the true voice of the revolution continues, with two sides 
competing to claim the mantle of legitimacy for themselves. On one side the removal 
of Morsi was justified on the basis that his government had failed to bring about 
significant change in Egypt. The vilification of the Muslim Brotherhood plays an 
important role in establishing the legitimacy of the action taken by the army. This 
narrative presents the army as the defenders of democracy, protecting freedom and 
delivering a democratic and progressive Egypt.
87
 On the other hand, supporters of the 
Morsi government argue that a democratically elected government has been 
overthrown, and that far from defending democracy and rights, the army has 
subverted the democratic will of the people and that supporters of the deposed 
president are being marginalized.
88
  This narrative presents the behaviour of the army 
as no less repressive than that which it claims to be combatting. Rather than engaging 
in the political process, the army has constructed a narrative of revolutionary 
legitimacy designed to appeal to those for whom religion and politics presents a 
dangerous combination.
89
 During this most recent stage of political developments in 
Egypt, the constitution has played a central role in this struggle for legitimacy.
90
 What 
can be seen from this cycle of allegation and counter-allegation is the way in which 
both sides are accused of having marginalized opposition voices and sought to 
entrench their own preferred model of governance, whether religious or secular into 
the constitutional structure of the state, without taking into account the preferences of 
the national constituency and the demands of the revolution.
91
 Therefore the question 
that underlies recent developments is ‘who are the people in whose name the 
constitution is being drafted’?  
This struggle over the narrative of the conflict demonstrates that the idea of a 
constitution as a static marker of transition is problematic. Far from representing a 
unified body politic, a constituency which can simply ratify the principles of the 
revolution, the constitution must be able to accommodate divergent aims and 
aspirations for the new state.
92
 In this sense a transitional model that relies on unified 
narratives of injustice is no less problematic than the traditional model. As noted, 
traditionally understood, constitutionalism proceeds on the basis that there is a shared 
understanding of the purpose of the revolution and the principles to be enshrined into 
the new constitution.
93
 Usually these principles will consist of certain principles of 
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justice in relation to human rights and popular sovereignty.
94
 Under this conception 
the constitutional document represents the entrenchment of existing agreed principles 
– those embodied in the revolution. 95  Where it is suggested that transitional 
constitutionalism diverges from this model is in the idea that, regardless of popular 
consensus, there is a normative framework for transition that determines the shape of 
constitutional reform. This is the contextual and contingent element of transitional 
constitutionalism whereby the constitution plays a role in transforming legacies of the 
past. However this approach proceeds on the assumption that the implementation of 
specified liberal principles of governance will become the framework for solving the 
problems of transition and indeed supplants the need for a unified political 
constituency. In effect the constitutional document is intended not to reflect but to 
bring into being a new and liberal body politic. In the case of Egypt, the struggle to 
claim the mantle of revolutionary legitimacy demonstrates the highly partial way in 
which law operates in these contexts.  
 
 
IV. Liberal Constitutionalism and the Politics of Transformation 
 
The underlying premise of the model of transitional constitutionalism is that the 
constitution itself will provide a focal point around which the citizens of the state can 
unite, representing the constitution of a nation. Through the liberal emphasis on the 
guarantees of human rights and the rule of law, whereby power is constrained within 
the new constitutional framework, it is intended that the constitution will provide a 
unifying focal point for a previously fractured polity. The underlying premise is that 
the constitution can replace politics with law, transcending political divisions with an 
impartial legal framework. In the case of Egypt, and the Arab Spring more generally, 
the assumption that law has the power to unify a fractured political community is 
belied by the deeply political struggle that is waged over the ownership of the 
revolution, and consequently of the constitution itself in Egypt.
96
  
 
A. The law and politics of ‘transition’ 
The transitional model assumes that law will be enough to deliver a new beginning in 
a linear progression from authoritarian rule to freedom and democracy. It also 
assumes that these features will be capable of securing the confidence and allegiance 
of the population. In this regard the Arab Spring presents both a challenge and an 
opportunity to engage with the concept of constitutionalism in transition. If the aim of 
transitional constitutionalism is to create mechanisms and processes that can assist 
with the management of violent conflict, a rush to closure that sees a the constitution 
as a substantive outcome to be achieved rather than an ongoing opportunity for the 
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mediation of political conflict risks undermining the goal it seeks to secure.
97
 Ludsin 
suggests that while the process of establishing a national identity does not require 
homogeneity, weak consensus could actually entrench rather than overcome existing 
ethnic, cultural or religious divisions.
98
 This appears to be borne out in the Egyptian 
context where division over the constitution appears to derive more fundamentally 
from disagreement over the conduct of the process rather than over the terms of the 
constitution itself.
99
 However in addition to the negatively focused idea that failure to 
ensure consensus perpetuates division, a compelling argument is also made that 
taking greater account of participation and representation in a transitional 
constitutional process can actually help to deliver the goals sought. Basing her 
conclusions on an extensive empirical study of post conflict constitutions, Samuels 
suggest that: 
The more representative and more inclusive constitution building processes 
resulted in constitutions favouring free and fair elections, greater political 
equality, more social justice provisions, human rights protections and stronger 
accountability mechanisms.
100
 
While critiques have emerged of the dominance of legalism in transitional 
justice,
101
 it can be argued that the concept of transitional constitutionalism remains 
rooted in a particular political construct of justice, human rights and political 
transition.
102
 Whereas transitional constitutionalism is an ostensibly consensual 
process, one in which justice and reconciliation are framed as part of an apolitical 
project that contributes to the creation of a political community based on adherence to 
shared norms,
103
 and based on the foundation of the rule of law,
104
 certain normative 
assumptions are made surrounding the nature and function that law should play.
105
 
The subject of these assumptions – namely philosophical conceptions of law and 
society – are themselves the subject of considerable political contest.106 This tension 
is not generally acknowledged. Rather the ‘transitional lens’ tends to obscure the 
inherently political nature of this choice, representing it as an objective and value 
neutral vision of legality that can transcend politics and mediate political choice. 
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B. Ownership  and political community 
Rather than encouraging a genuine exchange of ideas, the need for a unified 
narrative of injustice results in a struggle to claim ownership of the idea of justice, to 
be able to speak with the one ‘true’ voice of the revolution.107 The backward looking 
aspect of transitional constitutionalism that draws on historical narrative to frame the 
new constitution becomes a double edged sword. Because it is the history of injustice 
that will legitimate constitutional reform in transition, disparate voices must jostle to 
establish a dominant narrative of the injustice that led to the revolution that will 
justify the overthrow of the existing authority and shape the new constitution.
108
   
And yet this may not be an accurate representation of the political forces at 
play in transition. For while the model of transitional constitutionalism assumes the 
impartiality of the liberal framework as between competing accounts of the nature of 
the state, in practice it rarely operates as the neutral arbiter it purports to be. The 
liberal framework which underpins transitional constitutionalism fails to take into 
account competing visions of law and society that influence the extent to which 
constitutional norms will become internalized. Indeed the short term focus of using a 
constitution as a tool of peace making, intended to end a conflict, risks simply 
entrenching the preferred outcome of those who enjoy the political upper hand at that 
point in time rather than providing an ongoing forum for negotiation of the 
constitutional future of the state.
109
  
The ability to point to internationalized best practice in terms of transition 
removes the need to engage with domestic political concerns, focusing instead on an 
international audience. In the Egyptian context this limitation has been highlighted by 
Abou-El-Fadl, identifying the shortcomings of the transitional justice framework for 
addressing the concerns of the Egyptian people. In particular she singles out the 
inability of transitional justice as currently defined to address legacies of external 
involvement in Egyptian politics, and blindness to social and economic injustices as 
key reasons why transitional justice may not be an appropriate framework for 
Egypt.
110
 The question of who is represented in the process has been identified as the 
most important element in determining whether or not a population will accept a 
constitution,
111
 and the Egyptian case provides clear evidence of this dynamic.
112
  
Of course war, revolution, and the re-founding of order are not new 
phenomena. History is replete with newly won political concessions being enshrined 
into law.
113
 The temptation in the post revolution phase is to have concession 
inscribed into law not simply as a means of expressing consensus on new norms, but 
as a means of protecting them from the cut and thrust of democratic process. In 
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essence the demand for the entrenchment of certain norms represents an attempt to 
determine the rules of the democratic game - whether this is entrenchment of 
conservative religious principles, or entrenchment of secular liberal principles. This is 
evidenced in the desire to have constitutional processes completed within short time 
frames.
114
 This reflects the core underpinnings of transitional constitutionalism in that 
the entrenchment of constitutional principles is seen as a means of safeguarding a 
civic, liberal state from ‘democratic’ pressures. The short-term goal of the constitution 
in shaping a bounded political space becomes clear with this example. The purpose of 
the constitution is viewed as securing the boundaries of legitimate politics, shaping 
the outcome of the transition by narrowing the range of permissible interpretations of 
justice.
115
 And yet the introduction of prescriptive concepts such as democracy, civil 
society and human rights may do little to increase participation and legitimacy in the 
eyes of the majority.
116
  
The effect of the need to construct the myth of the revolution which presents a 
dominant or unified narrative is exclusionary. It encourages the drawing of 
boundaries around the political constituency to ensure a continuing unity. This carries 
the risk that there will be sections of the population who will feel marginalised or 
excluded from the new order.
117
 The revolutions that swept the Arab world in 2011 
are represented as a response to the suppression of political dissent in the interests of 
security and order. What is to be avoided, therefore, is the replication of these 
political, and more significantly legal, structures that similarly serve to stifle political 
difference with the aim of presenting a unified narrative of the new order.
118
 
However, identifying a tension between the idea of an internationalised transitional 
constitution and the goal of establishing political unity is not intended to dismiss the 
idea that international law has any role to play in transitional constitutionalism. Rather 
what will be explored in the next section are the ways in which international law can 
facilitate transitional constitutionalism without imposing rigid legal frameworks that 
undermine principles of participation.  
 
V. International law and the constitutional process 
 
Lerner suggests that the process of drafting a constitution is an ‘attempt to identify 
and articulate the fundamental norms and values that are shared by the people in 
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which name and for whom the constitution should be drafted.’119 While to try and 
neatly characterize the cultural diversity of any state or political community will 
inevitably result in an oversimplification, it is suggested there are three significant 
potential cleavages that must be addressed in any transitional constitutional process. 
These are ideology, culture and religion. Each of these factors will bear significantly 
on constitutional processes and the ultimate success of transitional constitutionalism. 
All three are also areas where extant international law potentially provides a 
framework for participation as well as providing guidance on how divisive political 
and social issues can be addressed. In this way international law can be used to guide 
rather than to foreclose debate on these issues. 
 
A. Ideology 
Despite apparently living in a post political, post ideological world, it would be 
foolish to assume that ideological differences will not play a significant part in 
constitutional negotiations. As outlined above, the model of transitional 
constitutionalism is rooted in the principles of liberalism.
120
 This embeddedness in 
political ideology tends to distort our vision of the potential of transition. Rather than 
looking at the political dynamics that exist within the transitional state, what tends to 
happen is that the ‘problems’ to be dealt with in transition are defined by how 
outsiders view the state or society in question. This is symptomatic of the increased 
international involvement of international actors in transitional constitutional 
processes. However the consequence that potentially flows from this is that external 
actors, or an international system that conditions legitimacy on certain benchmarks of 
liberal democracy ‘can distort the constitutional process in favour of concerns that are 
completely foreign to the relevant country.’121 So for example the characterization of 
the Arab uprisings as fitting within an overarching narrative of justice and 
democracy
122
 demonstrates how they are framed as expressions of how the 
international community views the problems in the Arab world.
123
 This view may or 
may not coincide with how participants themselves saw events,
124
 but will 
nevertheless continue to shape international responses and will have a profound 
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impact on the direction of transition.
125
 The application of the framework of transition 
assumes that the desired outcome of transition is liberal democracy.
126
 There is little 
room, if any, for alternative outcomes.  
Yet the idea of the ‘democratization’ of Arab states is not a new one. Previous 
attempts at liberalizing Arab politics reveal some of the tensions inherent in a project 
of democratization that is closely linked to liberalism. Kazziha describes how 
previous attempts at democratization had been characterised by incompatible 
ideological positions, seeing democracy on one hand as liberal democracy that 
focused on legitimacy and constitutionalism, and on the other hand democracy as 
economic equality and social justice.
127
 This demonstrates that the issue of democracy 
in transition is not as straightforward as repression versus freedom. There are likely to 
be competing notions of the relationship between law and democracy and where the 
division between the two should lie.
128
 International interest in the Egyptian 
‘transition’ already reveals some of the blind spots of transitional justice scholarship 
and practice to this cleavage. In particular, two key areas have been highlighted as 
absent from transitional justice agendas; ‘the accountability of foreign actors and the 
pursuit of social justice.’129 While transitional measures are dictated by international 
agendas they are unlikely to reflect the priorities of Egyptian citizens. Abou-El-Fadl 
sums this up when she states: 
…the millions participating in the protests of 2011 articulated an emphatically 
Egyptian conception of their desired transition, opening up possibilities for 
change that an externally imposed transitional justice framework is likely to 
smother.
130
 
The potentially divisive role of international actors in defining political priorities 
for Arab states should not be underestimated. Transitional Justice has evolved as a 
technocratic approach to political reform that denies in most cases socio-economic 
factors in favor of a liberal political model.
131
 However, this is not to say that an 
Egyptian conception of transitional justice could not be conceptualized in terms of 
socio-economic justice, particularly where corruption, economic inequality and 
international exploitation are driving factors for transformation.
132
 In this context, 
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whereas a very liberal approach may result in an exclusive focus on civil and political 
aspects of international human rights law, drawing on the existing canon of 
international law on the protection of social and economic rights can provide 
guidance on how these issues could be addressed. This is not to say that direct 
incorporation of these Conventions without dialogue is the solution, but rather to 
suggest that this body of treaty law provides a clear and accessible framework for 
further discussion of how the state should be shaped.   
 
B. Culture 
Much of the discussion of transitional constitutionalism rests on the capacity of legal 
principles to bring about transformative change. What is at issue is not simply a 
universalist versus relativist debate, but a more nuanced approach that seeks ways to 
contextualize the debate and place it in a cultural context that makes it accessible and 
acceptable to the citizens of the state itself. Constitutional rights, rather than being an 
externally imposed framework, should be understood as ‘a negotiated understanding 
of the acceptable framework for coexistence and respect.’133 This may, for example, 
require shifting the emphasis towards different conceptions of rights. For example in 
Egypt it has been suggested that the increasing success of the radical Islamist parties 
has been their appeal to poor rural voters, particularly men, seeking meaning and 
dignity in life.
134
 As with ideology, the framework of transition must not be allowed 
to obscure deeper cultural needs that must be addressed in the negotiation of a new 
constitution. Constitutional processes must therefore work within the local context 
rather than trying to supplant it with liberalizing norms. This means taking into 
account the history of political mobilization in the state, as well as the engagement of 
key players in the political process.  
In the Middle East an elite led programme of constitutional reform that remains 
detached from the rest of society is unlikely to become deeply embedded in the 
national consciousness.
135
 Prior to the uprisings there had been little attention paid in 
the West to unrest in Egypt, which centred around economic reforms and social 
justice rather than headline political demands such as those seen in 2011.
136
 Elections 
had been characterized by low turnout and voter apathy, and large sections of the 
population remain far removed from the urban middle class and elites who are 
traditionally associated with liberal demands.  Therefore while it would be easy to 
accept the ‘retrospective myth making’ 137  of the revolution as the inevitable 
culmination of protests in the Middle East, it was far from certain that the events of 
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2011 would occur in the way that they have done.
138
 In such a context it is clear how 
an ongoing process of negotiation of the content of constitutional provisions can play 
a useful capacity building role, either where there is little existing engagement with 
participatory politics, or where mobilization has been limited to specific sectors of the 
population.
139
 This is not about essentializing populations or attempting to distil 
certain ‘national characteristics’ that should be reflected in the constitution. 140 
Different groups within the state will emphasise different rights and different 
interests, depending on their own position.
141
 Nor should we assume that all groups 
within a society hold identical views, or that there is one right interpretation to be 
arrived at.
142
  
Too often in these contexts the debate is dominated by powerful groups who 
successfully monopolize the reform agenda. This can lead to a polarized debate 
between powerful players that excludes smaller or disadvantaged groups, particularly 
non-violent groups who have less bargaining power in peace negotiations.
143
 The task 
of negotiating the constitutional framework should effectively create the space for 
dialogue between these competing groups and interests without allowing some voices 
to be marginalized on account of their inability to contribute to a debate whose 
parameters have already been set. Rather than prioritising abstract and universalized 
notions of right(s), the debate must be located in the social, economic and political 
situation of the state itself.
144
  
Once again international law, rather than imposing restraints in this regard, 
provides an enabling framework for participation of marginalized groups. For 
example Resolution 1325 has long required that women be represented in 
peacemaking efforts. This provides a clear basis for including women as negotiating 
partners without necessarily foreclosing debate on the protection of women’s rights in 
the new constitution. Extant international law provides guidance on the question of 
the rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.
145
 Similarly the United Nations 
Declaration provides a framework within which questions of culture can be 
addressed.
146
 These frameworks specifically provide for the participation of 
minorities, without expressly imposing any particular model for that participation. 
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Indeed the provisions of international law have been interpreted and implemented 
very differently in different contexts, demonstrating how international law can 
provide a basis for contextualized implementation.
147
 In this way international law 
can help ensure that vulnerable voices are heard by ensuring participation without 
dictating substantive outcomes.  
 
C. Religion 
Religion is perhaps the most visible of the cleavages that exists in the Arab uprising to 
date and one which represents a much greater tension in terms of its relationship to 
international and secularized norms of human rights. However, as Daniel Philpott 
powerfully states, ‘an ethic that claims global relevance ignores religion only to its 
detriment.’148 In making this claim he speaks to a tendency to view religion as a 
source of conflict and therefore something that must be rigorously separated from the 
public political sphere. The project of liberalism has been rooted in a gradual 
secularization of the idea of justice and right and this is reflected in the dominant 
approaches to peacebuilding in the early twenty first century. However, as with 
ideology and culture, ignoring religion or seeking to deny that it has any role to play 
in a new constitutional order risks undermining consensus. The relationship between 
human rights and religion tends to be polarised, with each side tending to dismiss the 
other as incompatible with their own.
149
 Rather than framing religion as undermining 
secular constitutional principles, the mutually supportive role of the two should be 
explored.  While there is some literature that seeks to demonstrate the ways in which 
Islamic thought is compatible with the core commitments of human rights and 
democracy, the line of argument presented is not a simplistic assertion that Islam and 
international human rights law are inherently compatible, but rather a more nuanced 
approach that emphasizes the need for internal dialogue on the relationship between 
the two. The leading scholar in the field, Abdullahi An Na’im, suggests that while 
religion will not always be the only consideration for believers, it is ‘too important for 
the majority of people for human rights scholars and advocates to continue to discuss 
[religious considerations] simply as irrelevant, insignificant or problematic.’150 
This is particularly pertinent in the context of drafting a new constitution. The 
constitution will define the political shape of the state, and it is the state that will 
ultimately be responsible for the promulgation of law and policy. It is therefore 
important that the constitution appropriately acknowledges the context within which it 
operates, and provides space for a variety of competing claims and interests in 
relation to the role of religion.
151
 This does not mean that the constitution must 
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inscribe a religious ethos into the state,
152
 nor must it necessarily endow one particular 
religion at the expense of others. Rather a balance must be struck, which requires 
tolerance of religious difference, preventing the constitutional privileging of religious 
intolerance such as had been feared in Egypt, but also preventing the entrenchment of 
a secular intransigence that denies any role for religion.
153
 It is suggested that an 
overly liberalizing constitution that seeks to enshrine universalized principles of 
human rights and ignores the religious context within which it is to be implemented 
risks undermining the legitimacy of those rights in the eyes of the population. As An 
Na’im states,  
In relation to the role of religion in particular, it is imperative to engage in an 
internal discourse within the framework of the religious community in 
question, in order to overcome objections to human rights norms.
154
 
Therefore rather than seeking to isolate religion from public life and viewing it 
as a destabilizing force, greater consideration should be given to the role that religion 
can play in building consensus.
155
 This is particularly true in states where religion is a 
key aspect of identity for the majority of the population. Crucially, however, this must 
be an internal dialogue and not one which is foreclosed by the promulgation of a 
constitution that seeks either to enshrine or ignore religion as a means of achieving 
political gain. 
 
D. Procedure versus substance 
The very existence of these cleavages in any society suggests that a rush to closure on 
constitutionalism is unlikely to result in stable and enduring institutions of state. This 
has long been recognized in international policy that saw constitutionalism as a long 
term procedural process rather than a short term means of ending conflict.
156
 Rather 
than trying to suppress competing or even controversial political viewpoints, the 
success of a constitutional process will rest on the extent to which it can control 
competing political forces and construct political agreement based on consensus on 
the new rules and institutions.
157
 This does not mean that what is sought is absolute 
consensus across political, economic and social issues, but rather that there is 
consensus on the legitimacy and authority of the institutions put in place to mediate 
political tensions, as an ‘instrument for legally formalising political mediation in a 
written constitution.’158 This is not achieved by the imposition of a constitution, no 
matter how liberalising, that is not rooted in local historical, social and cultural 
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context. Rather it is achieved by involving all those with a stake in the new society 
within the decision making process, allowing the meta-debate to take place rather than 
relying on the rhetorical power of universal human rights to achieve the desired 
outcome.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
The Egyptian example demonstrates the limits of law, and in particular international 
law, in providing a neutral framework for constitutional reform. While the temptation 
for international transitional justice scholars and practitioners may be to import 
prescriptive lessons for Arab states, a constitution that bears little relation to the 
political, economic and social context of the state is unlikely to be helpful.
159
  
However when international law is viewed as a framework for participation 
rather than as providing a prescriptive framework for reform new possibilities are 
opened up to combine the transformative aims of transitional constitutionalism with 
the more traditional procedural approach of international law. This approach would 
support the aims of transitional constitutionalism by providing an externalized 
framework for constitutional reform, while facilitating a domestic re-thinking of how 
law and politics are regulated within the state. It would also address the context of 
past injustice in that rather than imposing a model on citizens, it opens up a space for 
free debate.
160
 This is important as the Egyptian experience demonstrates that it is not 
possible to separate politics from law in transition. Brown highlights how transitions 
cannot be designed, but rather are shaped by political contests.
161
 He states that  
‘there is no force outside the political process that designs a transition; there is no 
time out when politics ceases so that political systems can be designed in a pristine 
atmosphere…’162 
Therefore what is required is that both the constitutional process and the eventual 
outcome document are capable of channeling democratic pressures rather than 
foreclosing debate on the nature of the state and the allocation of power. 
Rather than pursuing an elusive goal of political consensus, what is required is 
a re-thinking of the notion of constitutionalism to reflect more accurately the idea of 
transitional constitutionalism as transformative- as opening spaces for understanding 
and dialogue that do not rely on the suppression of alternative 
(challenging/controversial) voices for its security. The role of the constitution is an 
important one in regulating law and state. If the transformative potential of a 
constitution is to be achieved we must remain aware of some of the ideological 
assumptions that are brought to bear by an internationalized discourse of transition 
that seeks to use a constitution to embed substantive principles of law and politics.  
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